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Abstract 
British Columbia shares a southern maritime border with Washington State 
that bisects the Gulf Islands from the San Juan Islands. The RCMP is responsible 
for the maritime border security between ports of entry. Challenges to maritime 
border enforcement include a lack of marine domain awareness, globalization, 
terrorism, transnational organized crime and drug trafficking, criminal networks, 
and jurisdictional issues. 
The RCMP have partnered with the US Coast Guard to enforce cross-
border criminality in a program called the Integrated Cross-border Maritime Law 
Enforcement Operations Act (ICMLEO), also referred to as Shiprider. The 
Shiprider program was implemented under the standard model of policing. By 
gathering and utilizing better information, adapting an intelligence-led approach, 
and leveraging technology, the Shiprider program could become more efficacious.  
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ICMLEO (Shiprider) vessel  
 
 
 
 
 
 
This 29-foot RCMP vessel is flying the Canadian flag, American flag, and 
U.S. Coast Guard flag which indicate an Integrated Cross-border Maritime Law 
Enforcement Operations (ICMLEO) vessel, staffed with U.S. Coast Guard and 
RCMP members, operating in both Canadian and United States waters. 
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Chapter 1: The border to be protected: Canada’s western 
coastline 
 
Canada is the second largest country in the world and its western border 
has a coastline of more than 27,000 kilometers. British Columbia is connected to 
the Pacific Ocean, the world’s largest body of water, comprising an area of 
approximately 182,000 square kilometers or approximately 1/3 of the Earth’s 
surface (Shuman, 2016). The Pacific Ocean is a major contributor to the world 
economy and connects British Columbia to maritime trade routes in Asia, 
Indonesia, Australia, and South America.  
The Strait of Juan de Fuca is 161 kilometers long, between 18 to 27 
kilometers wide, and is bisected by an invisible line separating British Columbia 
from Washington State. Vessels may have to cross the international boundary to 
get to their destinations. For example, BC Ferries passenger vessels that depart 
from Tsawwassen. B.C. have to travel through United States waters to reach 
Victoria, B.C. Container ships travelling to Seattle have to cross into Canadian 
waters, and ships travelling to Vancouver have to cross into United States waters 
when arriving or leaving their port(s) of call (Lynch and Gerbrecht, 2008). Figure 1 
(Google Inc., 2016) on the following page depicts the British Columbia/Washington 
State maritime boundary.  
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Substantial vessel traffic occurs in and around the maritime border not only 
by large vessels but smaller ones too. According to the National Marine 
Manufacturers Association (2012), approximately 610,000 vessels are registered 
in British Columbia with a majority of those vessels operating near the maritime 
border with Washington State. 
Lack of marine domain awareness  
The maritime border is the least understood and least protected 
environment (Moore, 2011). This could be because of the difficulty in seeing what 
is going on and the difficulty in responding to it (Paulus and Asgary, 2010). Other 
reasons could include the lack of maritime assets, particularly assets with the 
capacity to act offshore (Moore, 2011), and the lack of dedicated land-based and 
airborne surveillance assets. The culmination of these factors may result in little or 
no deterrence against illegal activity around the maritime border. Paul McHaile, 
 3 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, has stated there is a need 
to develop a mature concept of maritime enforcement in the Northern command 
area (Patch, 2008).  
Globalization  
Implementation of North American Free Trade Agreement on January 1, 
1994 was a response to globalization by Canada, the USA, and Mexico (Desrohes, 
2005).  Since then, many countries have deregulated their economies and 
liberalized trade to promote faster economic growth, to gain easier access to 
capital and technology, lower costs, gain higher productivity, and improve their 
standard of living (Pocuca & Zanne, 2006).  
Maritime transport has become the backbone of globalization and world 
trade.  According to the International Maritime Organization (2012) marine 
transport vessels carry 80-90% of the international trade cargo and contributes 3.5 
to 5% of the world Gross Domestic Product. The Port of Vancouver is Canada’s 
busiest seaport and carries approximately 60% of all of Canada’s $143 billion 
overseas trade of goods (including both exports and imports) (Transport Canada, 
2015). The safe and rapid movement of maritime cargo is vital to Canada’s 
economy.  
The globalization trend can been seen as beneficial or detrimental to global 
stability, the environment, peace, and sustainable development (Corbett and 
Winebrake, 2008). Lieutenant Commander Moore of the United Kingdom Ministry 
of Defense has indicated that a terrorist attack on their maritime supply chain could 
result in catastrophic shortages of food, fuel, and other vital resources within a few 
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days because over 90% of its country’s trade travel by sea (Moore, 2011). 
Terrorism  
The terrorist attack in the United States on 9/11 has caused many countries 
to re-evaluate their border security (Alach, 2011; den Hengst-Bruggeling, de Graff, 
and van Scheepstal, 2013; Carter, 2013; Svendsen, 2012, and Carter and Phillips, 
2015). Numerous academic studies on maritime terrorism have been qualitative 
and incorporate discussions around a number of highly publicized terrorist attacks 
against marine targets (Asal and Hastings, 2015).  
Over the past few years though, there has been a noticeable rise in high-
profile terrorist attacks at sea (Chatterjee, 2014). The most significant loss of life 
from a maritime terrorist attack was in 2004 when more than 110 people died as a 
result of a terrorist bomb on the Super Ferry 14 passenger ferry in the Philippines. 
Other attacks include the small vessel attack on the oil tanker MV Limburg in 2002, 
and the attack on the USS Cole in October 2000 when 17 American sailors where 
killed by suicide attackers using a small vessel (Howe, 2010).   
Contemporary terrorist groups may be actively seeking to extend their 
operational mandates into the maritime environment to overcome heightened land-
based counter-terrorism security measures (Greenberg, 2006). An atrocity 
orchestrated from the sea has the potential for an even bigger disruption of global 
commerce or a greater physical impact than the events of 9/11 (Mugridge, 2010). 
Terrorists could use large vessels such as oil tankers as ramming devices, could 
plant a bomb on a passenger ship, or conduct a mass shooting on a BC Ferries 
vessel. A study of 3,969 cargo vessels conducted by Winchester, Sampson, and 
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Shelly (2006) found the median number of crew on a vessel between 1,000 to 
2,999 gross tons were 11 and large cargo vessels between 70,000 to 99,999 gross 
tons only had a complement of 23 crew members.  
In addition to large vessels, terrorist groups may also exploit small vessels. 
Michael Chertoff, the US Secretary of Homeland Security has expressed concerns 
of a terrorist group using a small vessel as a conveyance to smuggle a weapon of 
mass destruction (Chertoff, 2007). The US Coast Guard has stated that small 
vessels weighing less than 300 gross tons represent one of the greatest risks from 
terrorism in the maritime domain (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2013).  
Transnational organized crime and drug trafficking  
The sure scale and diversity of transnational organized crime activity within 
the maritime domain is impossible to quantify (Mugridge, 2010). This could be 
because of two significant barriers: understanding the complexity of the problem, 
and the secrecy of the participants (Ratcliffe, Strang, and Taylor, 2014). 
Transnational organized crime groups successfully operate in economies and 
markets where: law enforcement environments are under resourced, lack capacity, 
and geographically challenged (McNulty, 2013). The maritime border between 
British Columbia and Washington State represents an area that has the potential 
to be abused by transnational organized crime groups.  
Transnational organized crime is not a new problem; however, it has been 
accentuated by the impact of globalization. Because of globalization, criminal 
organizations can globalize their operations, position themselves in new markets, 
and expand the range of their illicit activities (Lee and Farer, 1999). Transnational 
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organized crime groups may exploit differences in costs of goods and taxation 
levels between Canada and the United States (for example, alcohol, tobacco, and 
firearms). Simple inconsistencies in taxation between countries can create 
profitable opportunities for organized crime purchase goods or unregulated items 
in one country and illegally distribute in another country.   
Drug trafficking by sea has grown throughout the twentieth century (Aune, 
1990). Transnational organized criminal groups have been known to be 
extensively involved in the exportation of drugs from one country to another. The 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2015) found that the maritime 
smuggling of cocaine accounted for 60% of the total quantities seized, with an 
average seizure from 2009 to 2014 being 365 kilograms. In 2005, a total of 2,556 
kilograms of cocaine were seized in Canada (Government of Canada, 2005). 
Approximately 10% of the cocaine transits via air, and the remaining 90% may 
transit via the sea (Atkinson, Kress and Szechtman, 2017). As well, Criminal 
Intelligence Service Canada (2014) has observed an increase in drug cartels 
operating in Canada and seeking to establish direct cocaine supplies rather than 
third party distribution. As of 2007, the most common drugs being smuggled 
between Canada and the United States were MDMA, cocaine, and marihuana 
(Public Safety Canada, 2015). 
Canadian Border Services x-ray shipping containers that arrive on large 
vessels at ports of entry but do not do this for smaller vessels. Relatively little 
advance has been made in dealing with smuggling opportunities presented by 
small vessels because their regulations are almost exclusively focused on safety 
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rather than security (Ziock, Boehnen, Ernst, Fabris, Hayward, Karnowski, Paquit, 
Patolla, and Trombino, 2015). Needless to say, without intelligence, it would take 
a miracle to single out a handful of the 610,000 vessels in British Columbia that 
are illegally importing drugs.   
Criminal networks and jurisdictional issues  
In the last 20 years, organized crime groups have become more complex 
and networked, which poses evolving challenges for law enforcement. These new 
network structures increase their flexibility and they can avoid the hierarchies that 
previously governed more traditional criminal networks. New criminal network 
groups can quickly adapt to changing market conditions and outsource portions of 
their operations rather than keeping all of their expertise “in-house” (Bjeloper and 
Finklea, 2013).  
One of the ways transnational organized crime groups conceal criminal 
activity is to commit it in multiple national or international jurisdictions, using gaps 
in law enforcement information sharing to their advantage (Ratcliffe, 2016). 
Transnational organized crime groups see borders as opportunities while law 
enforcement sees borders as obstacles that involve multiple legal issues in 
multiple jurisdictions and extradition treaties.  These jurisdictional issues can 
present substantial diplomatic and practical challenges for law enforcement 
(Bjeloper and Finklea, 2013).  
Recent examples of cross-border criminality in BC  
In recent years there have been a number of incidents of cross-border 
criminality including human trafficking, drug importation, and money laundering. 
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The MV Sun Sea was a cargo ship that was intercepted off the coast of British 
Columbia on August 12, 2010. 492 Sri Lanken asylum seekers were on board, all 
of whom made refugee claims. According to a CBC news article, this one incident 
cost the Canadian Border Services Agency $22 million dollars, the Immigration 
and Refugee Board $908,000 and the RCMP $2.1 million dollars (CBC, 2011, 
February 9).  
According to a CBC news article (CBC, 2010, March 15) the RCMP seized 
1,001 kilograms of cocaine from ‘The Huntress’, a 50-foot sailboat registered in 
Panama in Port Hardy in 2011. Most of the cocaine seizures entering Canada have 
been from major seaports (United Nations office on Drugs and Crime, 2015). 
Clearly, transport by sea plays an important role in transporting controlled 
substances (Radionov, 2010).  
According to a Times Colonist article (Dickson, 2013, March 12), a male 
from Vancouver Island was arrested just after midnight on March 25, 2011 near 
the maritime Canada-U.S. border. Police officers from the Vancouver Island 
Border Integrity Unit attempted to stop a vessel operating without navigation lights 
when they observed a package being thrown overboard. The package was 
retrieved by police and found to contain $2.6 million dollars in U.S. currency. 
Who is responsible for maritime border security?  
When people think of border security they may think it is the responsibility 
of the Canadian Coast Guard, however; they are not a constabulary force. The 
Canadian Coast Guard (2013) is a Federal civilian maritime operational 
organization tasked with managing aids to navigation; marine communications and 
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traffic services; marine search and rescue; pollution response; icebreaking; and 
waterways management. 
The United States Coast Guard is substantially different then the Canadian 
Coast Guard because it is a division of the U.S. military and is the principle Federal 
agency responsible for maritime safety, security, and environmental stewardship 
in the United States ports and waterways (U.S. Coast Guard, 2017).  
The Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA) is responsible for border 
security at designated seaports. When entering Canadian waters, the master of 
the vessel must report his/her arrival to the CBSA without delay. The CBSA Marine 
Program identifies and intercepts people and goods that are inadmissible to 
Canada and seeking entry at a marine point of entry (Canadian Border Services, 
2016). Between ports of entry, though, maritime border security is the responsibility 
of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). The RCMP maintains a presence 
in the maritime border regions to address inbound and outbound criminal threats, 
which include national security crimes and transnational organized crime networks 
used to illegally move people or illicit merchandise (Royal Canadian Mounted 
Police, 2015). 
Integrated Cross-border Maritime Law Enforcement Operations Act 
British Columbia and Washington State share social and economic 
conditions that have laid the foundation for the development of a shared maritime 
border enforcement program. On February 4, 2011 former President Barak Obama 
and former Prime Minister Stephen Harper launched the Beyond the Border: a 
Shared Vision for Perimeter Security and Economic Competitiveness with a vision 
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of establishing a partnership to enhance security and accelerate the legitimate flow 
of people, goods, and services across the border (Public Safety Canada, 2016). 
One of the 32 initiatives was the development of the Integrated Cross-border 
Maritime Law Enforcement Operations Act, S.C. 2012, c. 19 s. 368, also referred 
to as Shiprider. This Act was implemented to provide additional means to prevent, 
detect, and suppress criminal offences and violations of the law at sea or waters 
along the international boundary between Canada and the United States.  
The Shiprider program is co-managed by the Royal Canadian Mounted 
Police and the United States Coast Guard. Law enforcement personnel from 
Canada and the United States work alongside on board each other‘s vessels in 
the sovereign waters of both countries. Within Canada, the Shiprider program is 
governed under Part 1 Section 7 (1)(d) of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act 
R.S.C., 1985, c.R-10 and in the United States, the Shiprider program is governed 
under Title 19 USC 1401 (Hataley, 2015). 
Shiprider has been seen as a successful initiative and is being assessed by 
both countries for permanent implementation (Lynch and Gerbrecht, 2008). 
The U.S. Coast Guard (2017) indicates they want to continue to build upon 
international bilateral agreements and work with interagency and international 
partners to grow partner nation capacity. This indicates the Shiprider program is 
here to stay and may even include further expansion.   
How well Is Shiprider working?  
The Shiprider program is more than just flying the flags of two countries; it 
is about international inter-agency cooperation. The Shiprider program is an 
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impressive example of international cooperation. The Assistant Deputy Minister at 
Public Safety Canada has stated that Shiprider been proven to be an effective 
method of deterring and interdicting cross-border criminality (Parliament of 
Canada, 2012).  
Hataley and Leuprecht (2013) indicate the Shiprider program is unlikely to 
be effective at combatting transnational organized crime because of the length of 
the border; the capacity to screen all cargo and people; and the capacity of 
organized crime groups to adapt to law enforcement strategies. This indicates a 
need to take a risk management approach to cross-border criminality. However, it 
can be a difficult endeavor when just one maritime shipment of drugs can represent 
significant costs to society. Rehm, Baliunas, Brochu, Fisher, Gnam, Patra, Popova, 
Sarnocinska-Hart and Taylor (2006), for instance, estimated the total societal cost 
of substance abuse in Canada to be $39.8 billion dollars.  
One may think that a highly political program involving international law 
enforcement inter-operability would undergo a yearly program evaluation –
however this has yet to occur. The Office of the Auditor General (2013) states the 
RCMP needs to develop a framework to measure and monitor the performance of 
its border law enforcement activities. Manjarrez (2015) states that there are several 
variables to effective border security but apprehension statistics and situational 
awareness enhance the ability to determine success or failure of border security 
efforts. 
Some Shiprider program data was published by Public Safety Canada 
(2016) for the year of 2015, indicating that 243 patrols were conducted, four people 
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were arrested and 25 violation tickets were issued. Public Safety Canada nor 
media releases by the RCMP indicate the seizure of any drugs or disruption of any 
organized crime group in 2015 by the Shiprider program.  
The standard model of policing Is not working  
The lack of available statistics on the Shiprider program is not surprising 
because it operates under a standard model of policing. This model consist of 
random patrols across the entire area of responsibility, rapid response, routine 
deployment of officers to crime investigations, and reliance on law enforcement 
and the legal system to suppress criminal activity (Weisburd and Eck, 2004). The 
uniformed presence is a visual deterrent, makes police vessels available to assist 
with emergencies at sea, and routinized vessel inspections help populate police 
databases.  
A study by Lum, Koper, and Telep (2010) found that these traditional beliefs 
about crime-fighting approaches persist even though other models (such as 
intelligence-led policing) can be more effective. Random patrols may increase the 
probability that cross-border criminal activity would be interrupted – however, 
Shiprider resources are insufficient to present a credible deterrence in maritime 
cross-border criminality 24 hours a day.  
The standard model of policing has no overarching strategy and does not 
place significant emphasis on data and intelligence analysis as a central 
component of police strategic thinking (Ratcliffe, 2016). The standard model of 
policing has been criticized for several decades as being ineffective. Unfortunately, 
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many police managers still rely on traditional enforcement tactics as the sole 
response to crime problems (Ratcliffe, 2016).  
Any organizational change such as organizational flexibility, data-driven 
decision making, and innovative problem solving that represents any substantive 
change from past management practices remains a challenge for police (Willis, 
Mastrofski, Weisburd, and Greenspan, 2004). Exiting out the standard model of 
policing can be difficult. The shift to intelligence-led policing is the most significant 
and profound paradigm change in modern policing (Ratcliffe, 2016). Carter and 
Phillips (2015) state that intelligence-led policing requires a shift in police 
management, organizational structure and even day-to-day operations. 
Chapter 2: What are other countries doing?  
The lack of maritime border security has transnational consequences 
because organized crime groups operate across borders (Bueger, 2015). The 
2008 United Nations Secretary General’s Report indicates that the maritime 
security strategies of the recognizes that United States, European Union, and the 
United Kingdom equally emphasize the importance of multilateralism and joint 
coordinated responses to maritime security (United Nations, 2008). Some 
countries are lacking marine domain awareness, some have made improvements, 
and some have taken a militarized approach to marmite border security.    
United Kingdom  
The United Kingdom (U.K.) is still trying to develop a successful maritime 
border security program. Lieutenant Commander Moore of the U.K. Ministry of 
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Defense has stated the U.K. has a serious lack of assets to comprehensively cover 
their 16,800 km of coastline (Moore, 2011). The Cabinet Office made two 
recommendations: strengthen oversight of maritime security through a 
collaborative and cohesive approach to preventing and responding to national 
security risks, and improve situational awareness. Seven strategic objectives were 
set: governance and decision-making; situational awareness; capability to act; 
protection of key assets; international engagement; partnerships and private 
sector engagement; and legal frameworks.  According to Moore (2007) the U.K. 
Ministry of Defense (2007) Future Maritime Operational Concept, has contributed 
little to the effective security of the United Kingdom.  
Controlled substances are still being transported to the United Kingdom. 
According the International Business Times (Wright, 2017) in February 2017, 
police in the United Kingdom seized 4,240 kilograms of cocaine from a fishing boat 
off the coast of South America. The success of this seizure was a result of inter-
agency cooperation between the United Kingdom’s National Crime Agency, the 
US Coast Guard, and the US Drug Enforcement Agency.  
Australia  
In the absence of a traditional Coast Guard, Australia protects its maritime 
security through the Australian Border Force. Australia has 37,000 kilometers of 
coastline and has one of the largest and one of the most challenging border 
environments in the world (Noonan and Williams, 2016). Australia is heavily reliant 
on maintaining open sea-lanes for trade because they are an island nation.  
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The Maritime Border Command (MBC) is a multi-agency task force that acts 
as the maritime law enforcement arm of the Australian Border Force. MBC utilizes 
assets assigned from the Department of Immigration and Border Protection (civil) 
and the Department of Defense (military) and acts as the primary government law 
enforcement organization in the Australian maritime domain. MBC does not self-
generate tasking, rather it responds to the requests of 26 client agencies (including 
the Australian Maritime Safety Authority, Australian Fisheries Management 
Authority, and the Australian Federal Police).   
A number of maritime security challenges in Australia in recent years have 
included drugs and people smuggling, illegal fishing and threats to marine 
biosecurity (Schofield, Tsamenyi, and Palma, 2008).  In 2005-2006 period 
Customs and Defense in Australia delivered an estimated 151.24 million square 
nautical miles of aerial surveillance which is the equivalent of 4,276 vessel sea 
days of marine surveillance.  
The Australian Border Force uses technology such as satellite marine 
surveillance, high-resolution cameras, radar, infrared sensors, unmanned airborne 
vehicles, helicopters, and Armidale class patrol vessels. Australia has clearly made 
substantial progress in enhancing its maritime surveillance and enforcement 
capabilities over the past ten years (Schofield, Tsamenyi, and Palma, 2008). In 
December 2006 the Australian Defense Department introduced new rules of 
maritime engagement, which provides for a “graduated” range of responses. If the 
vessel is non-compliant the response could range from a verbal warnings, the use 
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of tear gas, or firing across the bow of the vessel (Schofield, Tsamenyi, and Palma, 
2008).  
Drugs are still coming into their country. Australia MBC has intercepted a 
substantial quantity of cocaine – for example, according to the New Zealand 
Herald, a 50-foot sailboat was intercepted 300 km off the cost of Sydney, Australia 
in February 2017 by the MBC. Some 1.4 tonnes of cocaine were located on the 
vessel, making this the largest drug seizure in Australian history (Keogh, 2017, 
February 6).  
Israel  
Israel takes a military approach to their maritime border security. If a vessel 
is identified operating 200 miles off the coast of Israeli the authorities will initiate 
radio contact. At approximately 50 miles out, unmanned aerial systems monitor 
inbound traffic and provide geo-location to maritime patrol aircraft that overfly 
ships. If a vessel evades or ignores the Israeli Navy they can be expected to be 
fired upon and have their vessel seized if it crosses into the 12 nautical mile limit 
(Patch, 2008). No surprise this works.  
When you look around the world, there are a variety of ways to enhance 
border security. It is highly unlikely that Canada will develop a militarized approach 
like Israel. This author believes one of the base ways to improve maritime border 
security is to leverage as many agencies as possible: to utilize information, 
intelligence and technology to your advantage to improve maritime border security. 
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Chapter 3: What about leveraging information, intelligence, 
and technology? 
 
To better tackle maritime cross-border criminality, the RCMP could improve 
their marine domain awareness, become information-led, intelligence-led, and 
leverage technology. The standard model of uniformed vessel patrols has not 
worked. The lack of clarity and an absence of a common understanding of criminal 
intelligence terminology and processes can hamper information sharing between 
agencies (Ratcliffe, 2016). In a country where there is more than one agency 
involved in the campaign against drug trafficking, the various law enforcement 
agencies sometimes compete with others for increase prestige, projects and 
funding. Such rivalry results in a lack of communication, co-operation and co-
ordination between agencies, which, in turn, leads to bungled offensives against 
drug trafficking (Aune, 1990). 
Agreeing on when to share and use intelligence places agencies at 
loggerheads with each other in times of crisis (Ratcliffe, 2016). Given the 
transnational character of many crimes, international cooperation is not only 
important; it is the only possible response. Greater sharing of information and the 
coordination of joint operations by law enforcement agencies is needed across the 
world (Fedotov, 2015). 
  The United Nations (2015) stresses the importance of international 
cooperation in maritime security and that it is a shared responsibility that requires 
a new vision of collective security. Memorandums of understanding between law 
enforcement and national security agencies are often cumbersome and 
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convoluted, and put up walls of bureaucracy in the path of timely information 
sharing. Even if the bureaucratic hurdles could be overcome, there are other, more 
intangible problems such as a web of interagency competition, local and national 
laws, security clearance issues, turf protection, and rivalry, all of which inhibit 
actual cooperation (Sheptycki, 2002). There are some obvious hurdles to 
overcome to transform Shiprider into an information-led, intelligence-led and 
technology-led program. 
Information-led policing  
Police officers require as much information as possible to guide their 
operational and strategic decision-making. Being truly information-led means that 
police have knowledge of and access to many more tools and options beyond the 
constraints of apprehending, arresting, charging, and processing offenders. New 
strategies have been made possible through a broad movement in policing that 
has discovered the benefit – and necessity – of using data to inform decisions and 
drive crime control strategies (Ratcliffe, 2016).  
To successfully interdict maritime shipments of drugs, police commanders 
need to have information on timing, location, size of the drug shipments, and the 
means of transportation (Atkinson, Kress and Szechtman, 2017). Information 
sharing must become a policy and not an informal process (Peterson, 2005). 
Lieutenant Joshua Sagers of the Seattle-based Coast Guard Station District 13 
indicates he uses a best-guess approach to vessel deployments when he does not 
have actionable intelligence on cross-border criminality (Marcario, 2009).   
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Cohen, Plecas, McCormick, and Peters (2014) suggest that creating a 
database of all criminals; fully account for and understand your jurisdiction’s crime 
and disorder problems; and maintaining an up-to-date list of all community 
resources are ways a police agency can become more information-led. The 
maritime community is often the best source of information about offenders, 
vessels they operate, and when they travel on the water. Establishing and 
maintaining consistent contact with public is central to being information-led 
(Cohen, Plecas, McCormick, and Peters, 2014). A marina out-reach program could 
help Shiprider become more information-led. Uniform patrols can be 
supplemented with walking the docks, and engaging people about boating safety 
and cross-border maritime criminality. Being information-led means involving the 
local communities in crime prevention and crime reduction strategies (Cohen, 
Plecas, McCormick, and Peters, 2014). Kelling and Moore (1988) argue that police 
management needs to refocus their attention on establishing effective problem-
solving partnerships within the communities they police. There is a difference 
between information and intelligence. Once the information is collected from the 
community, it needs to be turned into intelligence by further evaluation and 
analysis (Peterson, 2005). 
Intelligence-led policing  
James (2014) argues that the foundations of intelligence-led policing was 
introduced by the Urban Beat Policing in Britain in 1967, while Carter and Phillips 
(2015) argue that the foundations came from the United Kingdom’s National 
Intelligence Model. Regardless of where intelligence-led policing originated, some 
 20 
academics agree there is a lack of empirical research on intelligence-led policing 
and how this philosophy should be conceptualized (Alach, 2011; Carter, 2013; 
Carter, Phillips, and Gayadeen, 2014; Carter and Phillips, 2015).  
Intelligence-led policing is one of the most enduring approaches to crime 
control (Ratcliffe, 2016) and is the most effective way to combat organized crime 
(Criminal Intelligence Service Canada, 2014). These factors include recognizing 
the standard model of policing was not working and recognizing the information 
sharing pitfalls after 9/11 (Alach, 2011; den Hengst-Bruggeling, de Graff, and van 
Scheepstal, 2013; Carter, 2013; Svendsen, 2012, and Carter and Phillips, 2015); 
decreasing police budgets and increasing workloads (Herchenrader and Myhill-
Jones, 2015); a small number of crimes are created by a small number of offenders 
(Alach, 2011; Cohen, Plecas, McCormick, and Peters, 2014; Ratcliffe, 2016); and 
targeting criminal rather than crime allow police to be proactive and thus prevent 
more crimes from happening (den Hengst-Bruggeling, de Graff, and van 
Scheepstal, 2013). 
In December 2000 the RCMP adopted a discourse of intelligence-led 
policing after perceived failures of trying to adopt the community-policing model 
(Deukmedjian, 2006). Over the years, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (2014) 
have refined their definition of intelligence to include the reliance on both tactical 
intelligence (operational) and strategic intelligence (prioritization and resource 
allocation). Intelligence-led policing is an evolving model that drives operations 
rather than operations dictating intelligence-gathering priorities (Ratcliffe, 2016).  
 21 
Intelligence-led policing is about: information; analysis of the information; 
knowledge and behavior of decision-makers who use the analyzed information; 
and the knowledge by decision-makers who assign police resources (den Hengst-
Bruggeling, de Graff, and van Scheepstal, 2013). Ratcliffe (2016) argues 
intelligence-led policing encompasses the following fundamental attributes: crime 
mapping and spatial analysis (due to the central place of crime hot spots in the 
definition of intelligence-led policing); structured thinking (given the importance of 
strategic analysis and the need to influence decision makers at the executive 
level); crime scripts (a technique that helps deconstruct complex crime problems); 
and, hypothesis testing (to enable a more scientific and evidence-based approach 
to crime problems). 
The successful implementation of intelligence-led policing requires an 
organizational environment that has the training, experience, and the maturity to 
drive evidence-based resource decisions based on analysis and criminal 
intelligence (Ratcliffe, 2016). If intelligence-led policing is to succeed and develop 
as the central paradigm of policing in the 21st century, then police managers need 
to address training and education in crime reduction practices, not only for 
analysts, but for all police officers (Ratcliffe, 2016). 
Technology-led policing  
Technological advances in transportation and communication have 
fundamentally changed the context in which organized crime operates (Lee and 
Farer, 1999). Transnational organized crime groups have access to cellular 
phones, satellite phones, encryption, GPS, and electronic money transfers. The 
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requirement to obtain search warrants for satellite phones registered in other 
countries, breaking cellular encryption, and tracking international money transfers 
can be a time-consuming process for Canadian police officers. 
Technological developments have also improved maritime law 
enforcement’s ability to detect and track cross-border criminality by using a variety 
of new technologies. Technology such as SIGNALIS radar, satellites, remote 
sensing equipment, high altitude aircraft, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) 
are part of an effective surveillance and vessel monitoring system (Walker, 2011). 
Other equipment such as gyroscopic binoculars, Forward Looking InfraRed (FLIR), 
night vision, and side scanning sonar devices may also enhance the ability to track 
vessels involved in criminal activity. 
Technology is not necessarily helping police formulate new approaches to 
policing, but rather improving customary responses to crime and disorder problems 
(Ratcliffe, 2016). Technology such as social networking platforms (Twitter, 
Facebook, Youtube, text messaging, blogging, and police-based websites) may 
make a community feel informed (Cohen, Plecas, McCormick, and Peters, 2014). 
When a community is more informed, it increases citizen satisfaction and trust in 
the police (Weisburd and Ech, 2004; Gill, Weisburd, Telep, Vitter, and Bennet, 
2014).  
Crime and criminal behavior is multi-faceted and complex. In an 
environment of physical restraint and growing fears of terrorist activities, police are 
turning to intelligence and analytics technology to conduct information gathering 
and risk analysis (Sanders, Weston, and Schott, 2015). Predictive analytics 
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software comprises predictive modeling to address the who, when and why 
questions regarding patterns of behavior, and forecasting their future behavior 
patterns. The emerging technology of predictive analytics is evolving rapidly and 
providing law enforcement agencies with better insight as to when and where 
crimes are most likely to occur (Lozada, 2014). Leveraging analytics software 
programs will allow police managers to make recommendations and draw solid 
conclusions from the processing of information and intelligence.    
If new technologies are to be part of intelligence-led policing, effective use 
of the technology has to combine with leadership to sustain such innovations 
(Darroch and Mazerolle, 2013). Technology training for police emphasizes the how 
to, rather than the why to, which suggests a shallow implementation and 
conceptualization of the role of technology within policing, and intelligence-led 
policing (Ratcliffe, 2016). A study conducted by Koper, Lum and Willis (2014) found 
that police officers have limited guidance and understanding of how technology 
might help them and their agencies and police agencies lacked reward systems to 
encourage innovative responses to crime. The range of data and information 
sources available to police analysts might lead one to expect that we are on the 
brink of a new era of holistic policing, but there is a real possibility that intelligence-
led policing can become the victim of paralysis by analysis (Ratcliffe, 2016).  
Chapter 4: Proposed strategies to improve Shiprider  
Improving the Shiprider program is not about improving the vessel 
handling skills of the members. Rather, it is about improving marine domain 
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awareness. The Shiprider program is an impressive example of inter-agency 
cooperation and needs to becoming more information-led, more intelligence-led 
and more technology-led.  
To become more information-led  
Establishing a marina out-reach program could help the Shiprider become 
more information-led. The maritime community may be the best source of 
information about offenders, vessels they operate, and when they travel on the 
water. Establishing and maintaining consistent contact with public is central to 
being information-led (Cohen, Plecas, McCormick, and Peters, 2014). A 
community policing approach increases citizen satisfaction and trust in the police 
(Gill, Weisburd, Telep, Vitter and Bennet, 2014). Instead of uniform vessel patrols, 
members could get off the boat, walk the docks, and engage the boating 
community on conversations about boating safety and maritime cross-border 
issues. 
Shiprider members could conduct presentations to boating communities, 
sailing clubs, and boating associations on maritime crime prevention initiatives and 
cross-border criminality. Being information-led means involving the local 
communities in crime prevention and crime reduction strategies (Cohen, Plecas, 
McCormick, and Peters, 2014). 
Crimestoppers (2016) is a non-profit society that receives anonymous tip 
information about criminal activity and provides it to the police. The media have 
helped promote the program and often run historical missing persons and unsolved 
homicides. For those wishing to remain anonymous in the maritime community, 
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Shiprider members could encourage people to use this confidential reporting 
system. Furthermore, Crimestoppers posters could be posted in marinas, 
encouraging people to report suspicious marine activity. 
The use of aerial surveillance could assist in gathering information on vessel 
activity (location, speed, and direction). A surveillance plane is more covert than a 
vessel and can cover a larger area in a shorter period of time. Furthermore, liaising 
with recreational airplane/helicopter pilots could yield further information related to 
vessel locations and potential cross-border criminality. 
To become more intelligence-led  
A study of ten police departments by Peterson (2005) found different 
operational and organizational styles with the implementation of an intelligence-
led approach; however, there were ten commonalities: command commitment; 
problem clarity; active collaboration; effective intelligence; information sharing; 
clearly defined goals; results-oriented tactics and strategies; holistic 
investigations; officer accountability; and continuous assessment. It is clear that 
implementing a successful intelligence-led philosophy involves more than just 
hiring a criminal intelligence analyst.  There are issues as well with integrated 
analysts into the police culture. Phillips (2012) found that less than half of crime 
analysts feel accepted as part of the police culture.  
In 2004, under Canada’s National Security Policy, Coastal Marine Security 
Operations Centres (MSOCs) were established to support a national response to 
perceived and real marine security threats to the country. A MSOC was 
established in Victoria and comprises members of the Department of National 
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Defence, RCMP, Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Canadian Coast Guard, 
Canada Border Services Agency, and Transport Canada. The goal of MSOC is to 
enable government departments and agencies to work together and share 
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance information (within the legal 
mandate of agencies/departments) through interagency staffing and collaboration, 
which in turn allow the MSOCs to support an organized response to potential 
marine threats and avoid duplication of both efforts and resources (Transport 
Canada, 2013). 
Police managers could have access to the strategic intelligence generated 
by MSOC. Agency leaders should make extra effort to either utilize intelligence 
products in their decision-making (Carter and Phillips, 2015). According to 
Peterson (2005) police agencies can adopt an intelligence-led approach by 
adopting mission statements, writing intelligence policies and procedures, 
participating in information sharing, establishing appropriate security, and adopting 
legal safeguards for the intelligence that is generated. 
Further integration with the Navy could establish joint patrols where RCMP 
members board military ships to conduct offshore surveillance and potentially 
identify cross-border criminality occurring in an environment outside the Shiprider 
patrol area. The participation of the Navy in drug patrols and offensives would 
provide them with useful training and, at the same time, complement existing 
interdiction forces (Aune, 1990). 
To become more technology-led  
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Technology is moving at such a fast rate that it becomes obsolete by the 
time it is fully implemented. Some police managers may expect technology to bring 
about transformative change and feel frustrated when it does not happen. It takes 
time, effort, and willpower to get major transformative effects from new technology 
(Fitzgerald, Kruschwitz, Bonnet, and Welch, 2013). A prerequisite to become 
technology-led is to foster a culture that is willing to learn.  
Technologies such as SIGNALIS radar, GPS navigation, and forward-
looking infrared (FLIR) technology are becoming user friendly. Many of these 
systems, along with advanced maritime weather forecasts, interactive tidal 
schedules, commercial vessel radio traffic monitoring systems, above and below 
water sensors, side sonar, and surveillance camera can be incorporated together 
to enhance marine domain awareness. It becomes evident that predictive analytics 
software needs to be incorporated to analyze data from these multiple sources. In 
short, the success of the Shiprider program is through the combination of 
information, intelligence, and technology.   
Chapter 5: Conclusion  
As noted at the outset of this paper, in referencing Moore (2011), the 
maritime border is the least understood and least protected environment. 
Transnational organized crime groups have taken advantage of globalization and 
operate in economies where: law enforcement environments are under-resourced, 
lack capacity, and are geographically challenged (McNulty, 2013). It will not be 
long before contemporary terrorist groups learn from transnational organized crime 
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groups and take advantage of the maritime environment. An atrocity orchestrated 
from the sea has a potential for an ever-bigger disruption of global commerce than 
the events of 9/11 (Mugridge, 2010).  
The RCMP is responsible for border security between ports of entry and the 
Shiprider program, coordinated by the RCMP and the U.S. Coast Guard, is an 
impressive example of international cross-border cooperation. However; the 
Shiprider program should no longer work under the standard model of policing 
because it has no overarching strategy and does not place significant emphasis 
on data and intelligence analysis. The Shiprider program will be doomed to failure 
if the main focus continues to follow the standard model of policing. 
A uniformed maritime police presence may have the ability to deter some 
cross-border criminal activity and there is value in conducting non-routine patrols 
and surge operations. However, this author proposes that the first priority of the 
Shiprider program is to have an intelligence-led philosophy. The shift to 
intelligence-led policing is the most profound paradigm change in modern policing 
(Ratcliffe, 2016). Successful implementation of intelligence-led policing will 
require: command commitment; problem clarity; active collaboration; effective 
intelligence; information sharing; clearly defined goals; results-oriented tactics and 
strategies; holistic investigations; officer accountability; and continuous 
assessment.  
 One of the keys to improving the Shiprider program is to act on the tactical 
and strategic intelligence that is being generated through the Marine Security 
Operations Centre in Victoria, B.C. According to Radcliffe (2016) intelligence-led 
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policing has the potential to be the most important law enforcement development 
of the century and sustained effort will be required for it to maintain momentum.  
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